I wish to express my gratitude to Irene Menear for inviting me to speak with you this morning as part of the 'Learning from Lonergan' series. My history at Thomas More dates back to the 1970s, where I was invited several times to the Institute and interviewed by Eric O'Connor, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen Going, and others on my notion of psychic conversion. So I thought it would be appropriate to share with you today some thoughts on psychic conversion, including of course ideas that are more recent than what I was able to share in my earlier appearances at the Institute. I will begin by narrating the birth of the idea, then will present a brief schematic history of its development and of the principal applications I have made to date, and will conclude by presenting my current thinking, which involves connections with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the depth psychology of C.G. Jung, and the mimetic theory of René Girard. It will be clear from the first section that Heidegger and Jung were influential in the very emergence of the idea, but in my current work I have developed some new perspectives in their regard, and I will mention these at the end. The material on Girard is quite recent.
2 in theology at Marquette at the time, and was enrolled in a course on the work of Rudolf Bultmann, writing a paper on the Heideggerian aspects of Bultmann's thought. Bultmann was heavily influenced by Being and Time, which provided him with what Lonergan would call the general categories of his theology, the categories that his theology shared with other disciplines. 1 I had been deeply immersed in the work of Lonergan since 1967, when I first read Insight, and in the spring of 1969 I had participated in a graduate seminar on the later Heidegger conducted by William Richardson at Fordham University -the most difficult but also the best course I have ever taken. From that time forward, and indeed even until today, I have been interested in the relations that might be creatively established between Lonergan and Heidegger. These relations are quite complex, but let me be quick to add that my interest is in a possible mutual self-mediation of these two figures, which will make each of them better than they are without the fusion of their horizons. I'm aware that the task has become much more complicated since I raised my original questions, due to the emerging information regarding Heidegger's involvement with Nazism and the very complex question of the relation of his philosophy to National Socialism. This is a question that cannot be answered easily, one way or the other. This political involvement -and I don't think there can be any question but that it was a very deep and long-standing commitment, and that he was not honest about it in at least some of his post-war statements -contrasts sharply with Lonergan's passionate commitment to democracy and to the educational and intellectual development that he judged was required to make democracy really work, coupled with his portrayal of totalitarian systems such as Nazism and Stalinist communism, both of which are mentioned by Being [Sein] ' is the economic development, the military equipment, and the political dominance of the all-inclusive state. Its ends justify all means. Its means include not merely every technique of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diplomatic pressure, every device for breaking down the moral conscience and exploiting the secret affects of civilized man, but also the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and torture, of concentration camps, of transported or extirpated minorities, and of total war.' 2 Nonetheless, far too often, engagements by Lonergan's students with other thinkers are one-way streets. I have always resisted that and found it quite antithetical to Lonergan's own way of reading other authors. As David Tracy remarked to me some years ago, Lonergan in generalthere are always exceptions to statements like this -was a very generous reader, and a number of his students are not generous readers; they prefer to sniff out counterpositions rather than follow his example of making his interlocutors better than they really are.
William Richardson had commented once that the key to understanding 
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Kant's or from Heidegger's twisting of Kant's meaning. 5 The language of conversion was familiar to me from the work of Lonergan, whose Method in Theology had appeared in 1972, with its emphasis on intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. 6 The work on Heidegger, both the early and the later Heidegger, had begun to give me a way of articulating a conviction that there is more to what Lonergan calls interiority than the operations that begin to be appropriated with the reading of Insight and that are developed further with the discussion of judgments of value and decision in Method in Theology. Lonergan himself points to that 'more' in Method in Theology, when he writes, 'Distinct from operational development is the development of feelings.' 7 But it is a 'more' 5 Ernst Cassirer says that beginning in section 3, Heidegger 'no longer speaks as a commentator but as a usurper,' wresting with violence from Kant what he 'intended to say' but 'recoiled from' because he was a prisoner of tradition, 'namely, that not only is temporality the ground of the transcendental imagination, it is also the basis of the "selfhood" of the self.' Ibid., translator's introduction xix-xx. Cassirer probably is correct, but this type of interpretation of other thinkers is typical of Heidegger, who is always out to speak his own mind and does not hesitate to twist the thought of others in doing so. Contrary to Lonergan's way of reading, however, he makes the other thinkers worse than they really were rather than better. Thus that at least by 1973 few of Lonergan's students were ready to take seriously. The conviction arose for me because for over a year before the notion of psychic conversion emerged in my thinking I had been experiencing quite unexpectedly a period of intense and very interesting dream activity, and had consulted a psychologist in Milwaukee, Charles Goldsmith, who used some Jungian techniques (in a very non-dogmatic fashion, I'm grateful to say) in the work of dream interpretation, though he was not a Jungian analyst in the strict sense of the term.
The dream work and the relation of dreams and symbols to feelings confirmed me in the conviction that there is more to interiorly differentiated consciousness than can be found in Lonergan's philosophy, particularly the philosophy expressed in Insight (which I continue to regard as a great philosophical classic, perhaps the greatest of the previous century).
Reading Heidegger's Kant book was the Archimedes' bath that produced the 'Eureka!' that became psychic conversion. This does not mean that I was comfortable with everything Heidegger says in the Kant book or in Being and Time. I am not -far from it. The first sentence of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' in the Critique of Pure Reason, which is central for Heidegger no matter how much he complicates it with hermeneutic phenomenology, namely, that 'In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed,' is for Lonergan the basic counterposition, and I agreed then and agree now with Lonergan on that point. Moreover, when I first read Being and Time, I could not avoid having constantly in mind the statement that Lonergan makes in his chapter on objectivity in Insight that '"time is" by being within the universe of being,' rather than that being is to be interpreted in terms of time. This is a radical difference, and the diagnostic is none other than what Lonergan calls intellectual conversion. I suspect that the difference is rooted 7 in Heidegger's work on Scotus in his Habilitationsschrift. Certainly it is in the tradition of the univocity of being that stems from Scotus. I agreed then and I agree today with Lonergan that such interpretations of the meaning of being are 'mere intrusions of imagination,' and I regard Heidegger's Kant book, where the time structure of the transcendental imagination becomes the horizon for interpreting the Being-structure of beings, as Exhibit A in demonstration of that claim. And yet there is a dimension that is opened by this emphasis that is precisely what had been occupying my attention ever since I first started reading Heidegger and that had simply become more urgent with the exposure to the dream world and to Jung.
Somehow, some connection had to be made between the unrestricted desire to know whose objective is everything about everything, an objective 'within' which time is, and the time-bound concern, Sorge, established by the Einbildungskraft that is for Heidegger the ground of the knowledge of the Being of beings. The original meaning of psychic conversion, then, as the notion emerged in my own thinking, lies precisely in this connection, in this link between two dimensions of consciousness (Lonergan) or of Dasein (Heidegger) -and I'm aware that Heidegger would not want to speak of Dasein in terms of consciousness, but I suspect that this may be because his notion of consciousness (Bewusstsein) is not as radical as Lonergan's, or it may be due to his unequivocal rejection of neo-Kantianism -or both.
Equally important, then, in the emergence of the notion of psychic conversion was the statement in Being and Time that Verstehen and Befindlichkeit, understanding and 'state of mind' or disposition or mood, are equiprimordial constitutive ways of being Dasein, where 'Understanding is grounded primarily in the future [whereas] one's state-of-mind ... temporalizes itself primarily in having been.' 8 Transposed into the terminology of Insight and Method in Theology, intentional operations, with understanding at their center, and the sensitive psyche are two distinct but inseparable dimensions of the self-presence that Lonergan calls consciousness. In either case -and in whichever language one wants to usepsychic conversion is the discovery of the link between these two dimensions, the establishment of the interior communication between them, to use the language Lonergan himself employed in Method in Theology when speaking of symbols. At any rate, these are the threads that suddenly and unexpectedly came together for me one afternoon while reading Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics in the insight that, in addition to the foundational conversions that Lonergan speaks of as intellectual, moral, and religious, there is a fourth dimension of conversion, one that establishes or re-establishes a link that should never have been broken, the link between the intentional operations of understanding, judgment, and decision, and the tidal movement that begins before consciousness, emerges into consciousness in the form of dream images and affects, continues to permeate intentional operations in the form of feelings, and reaches beyond these operations and states in the interpersonal relations and commitments that constitute families, communities, and religions. Needless to say, the inner and outer words that are reflected in this recollection had not yet emerged or emanated for me; in fact at the beginning I had different names for the conversion of which I was speakingaffective, aesthetic, psychological -but a friend, Vernon Gregson, who knew exactly what I was talking about, convinced me to use the term 'psychic conversion.'
A Brief History of the Idea
The original idea, then, was that there is fourth dimension of personal transformation, one not specifically included in Lonergan's discussion of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. This does not mean that it is unrelated to what Lonergan was talking about, however, and as I attempted to weave this idea into the substantial contribution that I hoped to make in my doctoral dissertation, I began to frame some of these relations. 'Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings' 9 and 'A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling.' 10 If symbols evoke or are evoked by feelings, and if values are apprehended in feelings, then feelings may be understood as linking symbols and values. And if that is the case, then what I was beginning to call psychic self-appropriation, the appropriation of one's life of feeling, particularly as that becomes manifest in the elemental symbols of one's dreams and similar psychological deliverances, might be expected to be relevant to one's existential stance as a moral subject, as one having to do with values and disvalues; that is to say, it might be expected to play a role in what is known as moral and religious discernment. This is the idea that was developed in my dissertation, subsequently published by Marquette University Press as Subject and Psyche, 11 where the principal interlocutors were not only 9 Lonergan, Method in Theology 37. The dialectic of the subject is the dialectic between the neural undertow that emerges into consciousness in the form of images and affects, on the one hand, and the orientation of the intelligent, rational, existential subject constituting one's world and oneself through one's insights, judgments, and decisions, on the other.
The point of the dialectic is not to choose one over the other but to assure that they are working harmoniously with one another. And so I came to call the respective poles of the dialectic, not contradictories but contraries. To regard them as contradictories is to head toward personal disaster. There is a tendency among Jungians and other psychologically minded people whose implicit or explicit cognitional theory needs some work to emphasize the psychic pole at the expense of the spiritual dimension. But I think there is also a tendency among some Lonergan students to neglect the psychic pole and overemphasize intellect.
The dialectic of community is the dialectic between a vital and indeed primordial intersubjectivity and practical intelligence in its work of establishing capital formation, economic systems, and political arrangements. Again, the dialectic is one of contraries, not of contradictories. Again too, communities are headed to disaster if they so emphasize either the intersubjective pole or the pole of practical intelligence as to neglect the other pole.
To these two dialectics taken from Lonergan I added a dialectic of cultural constitutive meanings. I called it the dialectic of culture. The dialectic of culture is the dialectic between cosmological and anthropological constitutive meaning. In cosmological cultures the measure of integrity lies in the rhythms of nonhuman nature, and the process of integrity moves from these rhythms first to the 13 community and then through the community to individuals. In anthropological cultures at their best the measure of integrity lies in a world-transcendent reality that beckons us through conscience and grace to attunement with itself, and the process of integrity moves from this world-transcendent measure to the individual and then through the collaboration of attuned individuals to the establishment of a community living in harmony with the measure. But this dialectic, too, is one of contraries, not of contradictories. Cultures that emphasize the cosmological and have not developed the anthropological are given to a fatalism that is linked with too close an identification with nonhuman schemes of recurrence, while cultures that neglect the cosmological risk endangering the natural environment with its delicate ecological balances.
I related these three dialectics to one another through Lonergan's scale of values -vital, social (the dialectic of community), cultural (the dialectic of culture), personal (the dialectic of the subject), and religious, and emphasized that in each of the three dialectical processes the human psyche has a constitutive role to play in the establishment of integrity, whereas distortion would occur, whether in the subject, the culture, or the community if one pole of the dialectic (either the spiritual or the psychic) was stressed to the neglect of the other. Jungians, I argued, tend to err on the side of stressing the psychic over the intentional, whereas Lonergan's students may tend to the opposite mistake. I was able through these paths to argue that Lonergan's understanding of the dialectic of history in terms of the simultaneous interplay of forces that make for progress, influences that make for decline, and the redemptive grace of God could perhaps be further differentiated in terms of the integral functioning or the breakdown of the scale of values.
At this point, the background work was finished that was required before I could turn my attention to what I have been engaged in since the early 1990s, namely, the construction of a systematic theology. My approach to that endeavor has been to begin with the systematic theology that can be found in Lonergan's own work, which may be the best theology written in a Scholastic mode since Thomas Aquinas, and to transpose it into the categories that he suggests in Method in Theology, amplifying these categories with the developments that would be provided by including psychic conversion in the foundational reality from which the categories are derived. I soon discovered -if I had not been aware of it from the beginning -that such a task must be collaborative. No individual can write a full systematic theology, in my estimation, no more than any single individual can know the whole of contemporary chemistry. It must be the work of a community.
My own efforts have been centered around what Lonergan wrote in the areas of grace and Trinity and, to a lesser extent, Christology (though I hope to expand soon on what I have done thus far in Christology). I doubt that I will be able to move much beyond these three central areas, but at least it will be a start, and I'm hoping that others will pick up on it. What I wish to do here is simply to indicate the role of psychic conversion in the so-called foundations of such a systematics. Rahner in implicit dialogue with Heidegger called the supernatural existentialthough I would probably conceive the latter somewhat differently from Rahner, as the gift of God's unqualified love appropriated by the existential subject either through some intense religious experience or, as is more often the case, through recollection of the gifts of God in the course of one's life -there is a Befindlichkeit that is quite different from the prevailing mood conveyed in Being and Time. The itself Lonergan mentions, in his initial presentation of levels of consciousness in chapter 9, that 'utterances' and 'free images' are among the data presented to consciousness at the empirical level, and that these are already under the influence of 'higher' levels even as they are presented at the empirical level. 18 Later he would emphasize that the data of human science and theology are themselves invested with human and at times divine acts of meaning, so that (and here I am using my own words) there is some kind of Verstehen involved at the very first level of consciousness -not, of course, the originating act of understanding that emerges from one's own questions, but something that I think is compatible with Heidegger's insistence on the universality of hermeneutic structure. Again, I related psychic conversion to this emphasis, in that psychic conversion establishes the link of the higher so-called levels with empirical consciousness. This link, I suggested, also enables us to integrate Heidegger's notion of truth as alētheia, undisclosedness, and Lonergan's insistence on the truth of judgment emanating from the grasp of a virtually unconditioned. In brief, that grasp is not possible without alētheia. The 'letting-be' of data and insight is part of the very process of 18 See Lonergan, Insight 299.
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verification that leads to the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. Nonetheless, that letting-be must yield to the unconditioned before the truth that occurs formally only in judgment is attained.
Let me return, though, to the attempts that I am currently engaged in to offer some developments on the psychological analogy for understanding Trinitarian processions.
There are four versions in the history of Western trinitarian theology of what has come to be called the psychological analogy. Neither Augustine nor Aquinas used the language of analogy in proposing their views, but the effective history of their trinitarian theologies has established analogical language as the correct way in which to retrieve their achievements. The structure of the analogy is the same in all four versions, and the principal difference lies in the first element in the analogy, namely, the analogue for the Father.
All too briefly: In Augustine, the analogy begins with memoria, which on one interpretation means the state in which mens, the mind, finds itself, and so Befindlichkeit; that state gives rise to a word, verbum, and from memoria and verbum together there proceeds love. Thus the Father is remotely analogous to memoria, the Son to verbum, and the Holy Spirit to amor.
In Aquinas, the analogue for the Father is intelligere, the act of understanding as it speaks or utters (dicere) what it understands; the Son is the Word spoken by the Father; and the speaking and Word together breathe the Love that is the Holy Spirit.
Essentially the same analogy is found in the early Lonergan, but with refinements. First, the word that is the proper analogue for the Son is a judgment of value, iudicium valoris, though this is mentioned explicitly only once in Lonergan's trinitarian systematics, De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica (now available with Latin-English facing pages as The Triune God: Systematics). 19 Second, the analogical process of 'intelligible emanation' in the human subject has been submitted to far more rigorous analysis by Lonergan than ever was explicit in the work of Aquinas, though Lonergan has argued convincingly in his study of verbum in Aquinas that what he is saying is entirely congruent with Aquinas's understanding.
The fourth version, if you want, of the psychological analogy is presented by the later Lonergan, and in this account the analogue for the Father is the higher synthesis of knowledge and feeling that is the dynamic state of being in love. From this there proceeds the judgment of value that is the analogue for the Son, and from the two together there proceed acts of love that are the analogue for the Holy 
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the dimension of graced experience, and I follow through on this in my own suggestions for an analogy that is explicit about the graced or 'supernatural' context of the analogy. I retrieve Augustine's memoria precisely as the graced realization of Befindlichkeit, that is, as the state of mind that results from a summation of one's life gathered to provide evidence that one has known unqualified love in one's own regard. This evidence, grasped in what I would call an existential-ethical reflective insight, grounds an ineffable judgment of value that slowly and over time becomes formulated in the faith that is the knowledge born of religious love. And from these together there proceeds the love of the one who gave the gift, a love that Christian theology calls charity. Thus for me grace itself has a trinitarian structure: gift, faith, and love. That structure may be vécu or thématique, implicit or explicit, in actu exercito or in actu signato. As I have expressed it here, it is appropriated in a quite thematic fashion, but it is 'ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of us to join.' 21 And the graced Befindlichkeit that I first tried to call attention to in 'Consciousness and Grace' now becomes the analogue for the eternal Father. 22 Psychic conversion has, then, become part of the ground for the derivation of special theological categories. The mimetic theory of René Girard has become for me the principal way of designating what I mean by what Lonergan calls dramatic bias, that is, the aberration of sensitivity itself that psychic conversion enables one to acknowledge.
Contemporary Applications
Girard's work can be related to Lonergan's if we begin with the following statement that appears in Lonergan's trinitarian systematics: '… we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and exercise our will in order to act.' 23 Again, this statement provides a perfect introduction to what I am attempting to do in proposing the notion of psychic conversion: establish the link between these two ways of being conscious. They are never distinct from each other, but the first way, which Girard discloses to be not only sensitive and psychic but also intersubjective or, to use his neologism, 'interdividual,' stands in need of a great deal of therapeutic endeavor on the part of the vast majority of human beings, aimed at the purification of the motive at the heart of our beseeching (to draw from T.S. Eliot and remotely Julian of Norwich), lest that motive be contaminated with unacknowledged mimetic impulse and consequently distort the very unfolding of our intentional operations. We are originally interdividual in ways that differ from one person to another, depending, in my view, on the extent to which love has been communicated to the psychic dimension of the person in one's earliest years. But 23 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics139.
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no matter how healthy that interdividuality may be, without some prolonged work on our part we will almost inevitably covet what our neighbor has or is, not for its own sake, but simply because he or she has or is what he or she has or is. This is the mimetic dimension to which Girard calls attention, and his elaboration of the manner in which it wreaks havoc on the human community is a permanent contribution, in my estimation, to our understanding of desire.
My recovery of the notion of psychic conversion, now in relation to the interdividuality that is stressed by Girard, has given me a way to return to Jung, and specifically to his notion of individuation. The individuation process is the process of untangling the vagaries of interdividuation. But I would suggest that a remarkably reliant way in which to pursue the individuation process is through the self-appropriation of the operations entailed in being intelligent, reasonable, and responsible -a self-appropriation aided greatly by immersion in the work of Lonergan.
Finally, all of this brings me back to further reflections on Heidegger and his equiprimordial ways of being Dasein, that is, Verstehen and Befindlichkeit. I think Befindlichkeit became Gelassenheit in the later Heidegger, where thinking is thanking, Denken is Danken, and Dasein is more at rest and at peace than in Being and Time. I may be wrong, but I hope this is the case. But I would also like to propose in conclusion that Lonergan can teach Heidegger something about the relation of Befindlichkeit to Verstehen, of affective states to understanding, that might facilitate finding the link between these dimensions (and between these two thinkers). In Lonergan's thinking there is a vertical finality of the psyche to participation in the life of the human spirit, in the operations of understanding, judging, deciding, and loving. In one sense they are equiprimordial, as Heidegger insists, in that they are seldom or never found apart from each other. But in another sense that equiprimordiality is qualified. In Lonergan's emergently probable 23 universe, what is purely coincidental from the standpoint of a lower level becomes intelligible as it is 'systematized' at a higher level: physical, chemical, biological, psychological, spiritual, to paint the picture in broad strokes. Befindlichkeit has its own horizontal finality, and the early Heidegger seems content to remain there. But the reality meant by the term Befindlichkeit never becomes what it could become until it finds its link with the adventures of understanding, affirming, deciding, and being loved and loving. That link provides it with a vertical finality to something greater than itself, and as it finds that link it becomes what it could never have become otherwise. I genuinely hope that there might be evidence of this in the contemplative atmosphere found in some of the later writings of Heidegger, but whether that is the case or not, I propose that these later writings provide us with clues that we might well rely on as we learn what it is to obey the first of Lonergan's transcendental precepts, the precept that enjoins a task on empirical consciousness itself, on Befindlichkeit, and so the precept that is related to psychic conversion: Be attentive.
